Graduating 2027 · open to conversations

Alexis Rolland Cybersecurity engineer.

Segmentation, identity, hardening: I design the security of critical systems at Alstom, one layer at a time.

Defense in depth

No single barrier is enough.

Every layer assumes the one before it has given way. Scroll: we open them one at a time.

  1. 01 Firewall the perimeter

    Anything not explicitly allowed is denied, inbound and outbound.

  2. 02 Segmentation zones and flows

    Sealed zones and listed flows: a compromise stays where it started.

  3. 03 Identity MFA, least privilege

    Every access is authenticated and cut down to what it needs. It guards the one open passage.

  4. 04 Encryption at rest, in transit

    Intercepted or copied data stays unreadable.

  5. 05 Data the core

    What we protect. Reached only at the end of a path checked at every layer.

Defense in depth

Only legitimate traffic reaches the core.

Hostile traffic stops at the perimeter. Whatever tries the one open passage runs into the identity check.

Alstom. Securing critical systems.

The security layer of critical railway signalling systems, from network segmentation to delivery. Five projects in parallel, in France and abroad.

Cybersecurity engineering apprentice — Systems, networks & automation · September 2024 — September 2027

≈450

cyber validation tests run and tracked through to correction

50VMs

provisioned from a single JSON file

5

projects in parallel, in France and abroad

Delivery Compliance Toolkit

Designed and built on my own. Now the standard across projects.

A Python and PyQt application that remotely brings Windows and Linux systems into compliance over WinRM and SSH before delivery. No secrets in clear text on disk, a report at the end.

  1. NTP synchronisation
  2. Domain membership
  3. Accounts
  4. Integrity
  5. Certificates
  6. Log purge
  7. Antivirus scan
  8. Encrypted configuration
  9. HTML report

Cyber integration

Segmentation (VLANs, port openings, firewall filtering), traffic flow analysis, isolation of the administration network, Active Directory, certificates, endpoint protection.

Architecture and test strategy

A method to derive cyber test cases directly from architecture requirements, on a nationwide railway project.

Audit and access management

Account and password audit scripts, a study of centralised secrets management, hardening of end-of-life systems.

Virtualization and containers

VMware vSphere automated with PowerCLI, Docker, Kubernetes, Harvester, and a GUI driving a hyperconvergence platform's API.

Before Société Générale, 2023 · Internship — cybersecurity standards documentation. Reworked cyber standards and guides, updated cross-references, fixed inconsistencies.

Trained in Paris. Specialised in Gatineau.

2022 — 2027

ESIEE Paris

Engineering degree, Networks and security

Work-study programme, SecNumedu-certified by ANSSI, France's national cybersecurity agency.

  • Secure networks
  • Cryptography and PKI
  • Governance
  • Pentest and IDS
  • Forensics
  • Linux hardening

Noisy-le-Grand

Sept — Dec 2026

Université du Québec en Outaouais

Graduate diploma (DESS) in cybersecurity, dual degree

An advanced specialisation semester, alongside the engineering curriculum.

  • Cyber intelligence
  • DFIR
  • Advanced cryptography
  • Social engineering
  • IT/OT incident response

Gatineau, Canada

Certifications

Earned · October 2026

CompTIA Security+

CompTIA · SY0-701

Risk, secure architecture, incident response, governance.

Verify CompTIA Security+

Earned · December 2025

CCNA ENSA

Cisco Networking Academy

Enterprise Networking, Security & Automation course: advanced routing, WAN, network security.

Verify CCNA ENSA

Targeted · 2027

Azure cloud certification

Microsoft

Taking the identity and security work I do on-premise today into the cloud.

Languages and scores

B1

German · Intermediate

Homelab

The homelab. Same principles, at home.

Three machines run day and night, segmented and documented like production. Scroll to open them up.

Three machines. One job each.

A hypervisor for the lab, a NAS for data and services, a controller for the house. Running around the clock, documented like production.

A single open port.

UDP 51820, reserved for administration over WireGuard. Everything else is published through a Cloudflare tunnel initiated from the inside, behind Authentik single sign-on.

Proxmox VE

What I break stays contained.

A virtualized OPNsense isolates the lab on 10.1.1.0/24. Windows, Active Directory and CTF VMs only get outbound NAT. Samples under analysis get no network interface at all.

TrueNAS SCALE

Data outlives the machine.

Mirrored ZFS pools, regular snapshots and 2 TB encrypted client-side before leaving for off-site storage. The 3-2-1 rule, applied at home.

The whole architecture, trade-offs included.

Zones, traffic flows, deliberate choices and known limitations. The repositories document every machine.

Overview Architecture diagram: from the Internet, services are published through an outbound Cloudflare tunnel and administration goes through a WireGuard VPN, the only open port. The machines sit on the 192.168.1.0/24 home LAN; a virtualized OPNsense firewall isolates the lab network on 10.1.1.0/24. Four usage zones are shown — core and administration, published services, lab, IoT and home automation — and the first two feed a 3-2-1 backup chain. Internet Cloudflare Tunnel Outbound only — no port forwarding WireGuard VPN UDP 51820 — the only open port, admin only ISP router → LAN 192.168.1.0/24 OPNsense, virtualized on the hypervisor, isolates the lab on 10.1.1.0/24 — filtering, outbound NAT, logging Core & administration LAN 192.168.1.0/24 › Proxmox VE host › TrueNAS SCALE › Home Assistant OS › OPNsense administration Published services Docker · outbound tunnel › Nextcloud, Immich, Jellyfin › Gitea, Vaultwarden › Authentik (SSO/MFA) › Reverse proxy + TLS Lab 10.1.1.0/24 · OPNsense › Windows Server / AD › CTF & pentest VMs › Analysis in an isolated VM › Disposable VMs (snapshots) IoT & home automation Zigbee · local processing › Zigbee2MQTT gateway › ESPHome / ESP32 sensors › Local video surveillance › Alarm: keypad & siren 3-2-1 backup Versioned ZFS snapshots · redundant disks · 2 TB encrypted off-site Allowed, filtered traffic Backup traffic
Scroll the diagram horizontally on a small screen.
  • Core & administration

    LAN 192.168.1.0/24

    Traffic rule : No management interface is ever published. The hypervisor, the NAS, the firewall and SSH access are reachable from the VPN only.

  • Published services

    Docker · outbound tunnel

    Traffic rule : The only published zone, and only through a tunnel initiated from the inside: no inbound port. Every service in its own container, behind a single reverse proxy and centralised authentication.

  • Lab

    10.1.1.0/24 · OPNsense

    Traffic rule : Behind the virtualized firewall, with outbound NAT as its only way out. The lab initiates no traffic towards the home LAN and is reachable neither from outside nor from the services.

  • IoT & home automation

    Zigbee · local processing

    Traffic rule : The sensors speak Zigbee, not IP: they reach their controller and nothing else. Video and automations are processed on site, nothing leaves for a third-party cloud.

The three nodes

Proxmox VE — virtualization & lab

Hypervisor: LXC service containers, virtualized firewall, disposable test environments.

  • GMKtec K12 — 32 GB DDR5, NVMe SSD, low power draw, running 24/7
  • LXC: WireGuard (administration VPN) and Apache Guacamole (web RDP/SSH/VNC remote access)
  • Virtualized OPNsense: separation between the 192.168.1.0/24 LAN and the 10.1.1.0/24 lab network
  • Windows Server / Active Directory, Ubuntu, CTF and pentest VMs — restored from snapshot after each experiment
Repository Proxmox VE

TrueNAS SCALE — storage & services

Redundant storage and hosting for day-to-day containerized services.

  • Jonsbo N4 — Ryzen 5 5600, 32 GB DDR4
  • NVMe for the OS, SSDs for containers, 2 × 4 TB of data, 8 TB of media — separate ZFS pools
  • Around twenty containers: Nextcloud, Immich, Jellyfin, Gitea, Vaultwarden, ONLYOFFICE, Matrix
  • Authentik (SSO/MFA), reverse proxy and TLS, outbound tunnel agent, encrypted off-site replication
Repository TrueNAS SCALE

Home Assistant OS — home automation & physical monitoring

Alarm, automations and video surveillance, processed entirely locally.

  • Dedicated mini-PC on SSD, 24/7, with no external service required for it to work
  • Alarm with a physical keypad and Zigbee siren, alerts and clips pushed through a Telegram bot
  • Local object detection on the cameras: no video stream ever leaves the house
  • Zigbee gateway (Zigbee2MQTT + local MQTT broker), custom sensors on ESPHome/ESP32
  • SSH, file sharing and management interfaces reachable through the VPN only
Repository Home Assistant OS

Trade-offs

  1. Publishing services?

    Outbound tunnel, except WireGuard.

    No port to expose. WireGuard stays direct: it's the fallback path if the tunnel goes down.

  2. The firewall?

    Virtualized.

    Flexible and reversible through snapshots, with no room for a box. The price: a single point of failure.

  3. Administration?

    VPN only.

    An exposed management interface turns an authentication flaw into full compromise.

  4. A VLAN for IoT?

    Not yet.

    Zigbee sensors are off the IP network, connected devices aren't: that's the next step.

Acknowledged limitations

An architecture presented without its blind spots isn't an architecture, it's a brochure. Here's what this one doesn't cover.

  • Single point of failure on the hypervisor: it carries the lab firewall, the administration VPN and the test environments.
  • No VLANs on the home LAN: isolation stops at the lab network, per-container separation and the Zigbee radio network.
  • Service publishing depends on a third party: its outage makes them unreachable from outside, VPN aside.
  • No power or network redundancy: an outage takes everything down.
  • No centralised logging yet: the firewall logs, but nothing correlates the three nodes.
  • Backups are spot-checked, not yet validated by a full, periodic restore test.
  • Space is the binding constraint: the flat has no room for the hardware that would lift several of these limitations — a dedicated VPN appliance, a physical box for OPNsense, a KVM over IP to take back control when the hypervisor stops answering. Those trade-offs are dictated by available space, not by design.
  • No out-of-band recovery: if a machine stops booting, it takes being physically in front of it.
  • The scale is still that of a lab: conclusions drawn here don't transpose as-is to an enterprise estate.

Next steps

  • Set up a dedicated VLAN for the home's IoT devices and deny it Internet egress.
  • Centralise logs from the three nodes and write a first set of detection rules.
  • Run a full restore from the off-site copy, stopwatch in hand.
  • Write a recovery procedure readable by someone other than me.

An incident in progress, two hours to contain it.

Designing, instrumenting and running an incident response exercise: another team takes the SOC analyst shift at a small maple syrup producer and must detect, assess and contain an incident unfolding in real time, without shutting production down.

UQO · Team project in a lab

2 h

SOC shift in real time, at most

5

log sources centralised in Splunk

6 wk

sugaring season, when any shutdown costs the most

What the SOC sees, source by source.

  1. 1 Firewall: every flow between zones
  2. 2 Application servers: the exposed face
  3. 3 Active Directory: authentications
  4. 4 Bastion: administration sessions
  5. 5 Sensors: the physical process
  6. 6 Splunk correlates: one console
Read the case study
Internet
Marketplace website
Router-firewall 192.168.0.1

Website LAN Website

192.168.1.0/24

  • Reverse proxy .1
  • Apache .2
  • E-commerce application server .3
  • E-commerce database .4

Administrative LAN Admin

192.168.2.0/24

  • Active Directory .1
  • Bastion .2
  • Splunk (SIEM) .3
  • IT admin workstation .4
  • HR · Finance · Sales · Management laptops .5–.8

Production LAN Production

192.168.3.0/24

  • SCADA server (supervision) .1
  • HMI operator station .2
  • IoT gateway
  • Valve position sensor
  • Temperature sensor
  • Valve control PLC

Érablière Boréale IT

What I bring. From network to identity, from audit to tooling.

Architecture and segmentation

Zones, allowed flows, an isolated administration network. On critical systems as well as at home.

Identity and access

Active Directory, PKI, account audits, SSO and MFA. Least privilege, verified.

Offensive, response and OT

Pentesting, incident response, DFIR, threat intelligence, IT/OT environments.

Automation

Python, PowerShell, PowerCLI: whatever repeats becomes a tool.

Governance and risk

Risk analysis and compliance, to decide where security truly matters.

All skills
Defense and governance
ISO 27001 · EBIOS · GDPR · MITRE ATT&CK · Defense in depth · Security by Design · Risk management
Zero-Trust and IAM
Active Directory · PKI · Authentik (SSO/MFA) · FIDO2 key · Vaultwarden · Cloudflare Tunnel · WireGuard · Reverse proxy / TLS · Least privilege
Networking
TCP/IP · VLAN · OSPF / BGP · MPLS · IPv6 · IPsec VPN · OPNsense · Wireshark · Cisco ENSA
Offensive and response
Pentesting · Incident response · Metasploit · Nessus · IDS · DFIR · FTK / Autopsy · MISP · STIX/TAXII · OSINT · SIEM · CTF
Systems and virtualization
Proxmox VE · VMware vSphere · PowerCLI · TrueNAS SCALE · ZFS · Docker · Kubernetes · Harvester · Linux
Languages
Python · PowerShell · Bash · C · Assembly · Java · Git
Cryptography
AES · RSA · Elliptic curves · X.509 · TLS · Kerberos · Cryptanalysis
IoT and home automation
Home Assistant OS · Zigbee2MQTT · MQTT · ESPHome / ESP32 · Frigate · Local processing
AI tooling
Coding agents · Security-focused review · Architecture analysis · Documentation
Zero blind trust: AI speeds up tooling, review and documentation; decisions and validation stay human, and nothing confidential leaves its authorised perimeter.

Off screen. The rest of the time.

Volunteer tutoring

Five years supporting a dyslexic person with note-taking and writing.

Game jams

One game, one team, one weekend. A good school for shipping under constraint.

Curiosities

Industrial cybersecurity, local AI, OSINT, cryptography. And watchmaking, which fascinates me: understanding what holds a mechanism together.

Let's talk.

Graduating in September 2027, open to conversations now.

Gatineau (Québec) until December 2026, Paris region after that

alexis@rolland.app — zsh

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